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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Benjamin Dugan appeals from his conviction for injuring jails. Specifically,
he challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss.

Statement of Facts and Course of the Proceedings
The facts and course of proceedings relating to this appeal are as set
forth by the district court in its memorandum decision denying Dugan's motion to
dismiss:
On December 5, 2011, the defendant was transported from
the Blaine County Detention Facility to the Blaine County
Courthouse in a Sheriff's Office transport vehicle. The Court
ordered the defendant to serve 30 days in the county jail. The
defendant was then placed back in the transport vehicle to be
taken back to the Blaine County Detention Center. The defendant
spit on "all surfaces" of the rear of the vehicle and vomited in the
rear cargo area. He also kicked and head-butted the windows and
door panels, causing damage to both rear doors and the rear left
gate panel.
(R., pp.53-54.)
That state charged Dugan with injuring jails.

(R., pp.22-23.)

The

magistrate court found probable cause for the charge, binding Dugan over to
district court on the felony. (1/5/12 Tr., p.32, Ls.16-18.) Dugan filed a motion to
dismiss and brief in support of his motion asserting the transport vehicle did not
constitute a "place of confinement," thereby removing his conduct from the realm
of Idaho Code § 18-7018, the injuring jails statute. (R., pp.33-43.) Following a
hearing on the motion, the court took the matter under advisement (4/3/12 Tr.,
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p.18, Ls.19-22), ultimately issuing a written decision denying Dugan's motion to
dismiss (R., pp.53-62).
The district court, in failing to accept Dugan's argument that a place of
confinement had to be a building and denying his motion to dismiss the charge
against him, concluded the transport vehicle utilized by the Sheriffs Department
to transport Dugan back to jail after being sentenced to a period of incarceration
was in fact a "place of confinement" as envisioned by I.C. § 18-7018:
"Other place of confinement" means a physical environment or
surrounding that is intended to imprison or restrain someone. As a
jail's transport vehicle is a physical surrounding, does imprison or
restrain inmates, and is the operational or maintenance equipment
of the jail. This Court must find that the defendant can be charged
with Injury to Jail for damaging the transport vehicle.

CR., pp.60.)
Dugan entered a conditional plea of guilty to injuring jails, reserving his
right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss. (R., pp.63-64;
pp.87 -88.) The court sentenced Dugan to a unified term of five years, with the
first two years fixed. (R., p.76.) Dugan timely appealed. (R., pp.95-97.)
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ISSUE
Dugan states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err by denying Mr. Dugan's Motion to
Dismiss because a patrol vehicle does not constitute a "place of
confinement"?
(Appellant's brief, p.6.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Dugan failed to show that the district court erred in denying his
motion to dismiss?
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ARGUMENT
Dugan Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred In Denying His
Motion To Dismiss
Introduction

A.

Dugan asserts on appeal the district court erred in denying his motion to
dismiss "based upon the failure of the State to establish probable cause for
every element of the charged offense" where "a patrol vehicle is not a 'place of
confinement' within the meaning of the statute."

(Appellant's brief, p.7.)

Because a review of the plain language of the statute establishes a
transport vehicle is another place of confinement as envisioned by the statute,
Dugan's argument fails.

Standard Of Review

B.

A defendant challenging the sufficiency of evidence presented at a
preliminary hearing must demonstrate that the state failed to present substantial
evidence as to every material element of the offense charged. Idaho Criminal
Rule 5.1 (b).

Reviewing courts will not substitute their judgment for that of the

magistrate as to the weight of the evidence and a probable cause finding will not
be disturbed if any reasonable view of the evidence, including permissible
inferences, support findings that the offense occurred and the accused
committed it.

State v. Pole, 139 Idaho 370, 372, 79 P.3d 729, 731 (Ct. App.

2003) (citing State v. Holcomb, 128 Idaho 296, 299, 912 P.2d 664,667 (Ct. App.
1995)).
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The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law
over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140
Idaho 796,798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404,405,
94 P.3d 709, 710 (Ct. App. 2004).

C.

The District Court Correctly Denied Dugan's Motion To Dismiss Finding
The Transport Vehicle Constituted A Place Of Confinement As Envisioned
By Idaho Statute
The magistrate court found probable cause to believe Dugan had

committed the offense of injuring jails in violation of Idaho Code § 18-7018
(1/5/12 Tr., p.32, Ls.16-18) and the trial court denied Dugan's motion to dismiss,
concluding the statute was plain and unambiguous and included the conduct
engaged in by Dugan (R., pp.53-62).

The only disputed issue on appeal is

whether the transport vehicle utilized by law enforcement to transport Dugan to
and from his sentencing hearing is a "place of confinement" as envisioned by I.C.

§ 18-7018.
Idaho Code § 18-7018 provides:
Every person who wilfully [sic] and intentionally breaks down, pulls
down or otherwise destroys or injures any public jailor other place
of confinement, is punishable by fine not exceeding $10,000, and
by imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding five years.
Dugan argues "the plain meaning of the phrase 'place of confinement' does not
include a patrol vehicle," and as such, "the district court erred in denying [his]
motion to dismiss." (Appellant's brief, p.13.) This argument fails.
"Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court
must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory
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construction." State v. Jones, 151 Idaho 943,946,265 P.3d 1155, 1158 (Ct.
App. 2011) (citations omitted). "The language of the statute is to be given its
plain, obvious, and rational meaning."

kl Resort to legislative history and rules

of statutory interpretation is unnecessary where the language of the statute is
clear and unambiguous.

kl

Dugan argues on appeal that the "plain, obvious, rational meaning" of the
term "place of confinement" must be a "jailor correctional facility." (Appellant's
brief, p.10.) He relies on an 8th Circuit case from the state of Missouri as well as
New York case for his position that a place of confinement must necessarily be a
building but discounts a recent Utah Court of Appeals Case, with similar facts to
the present case, finding a police vehicle can be a place of confinement.
(Appellant's brief, pp.12-13.) In concluding the transport vehicle in question was
a place of confinement as envisioned by Idaho statute, the trial court found
Dugan's case analogous to the Utah case, State v. Burgess-Beynon, 99 P.3d
383 (Ut. App. 2004):
While this Court is not aware of any appellate Idaho case
law regarding I.C. § 18-7018 interpreting the meaning of "other
place of confinement," this Court finds this case to be very
analogous to Utah v. Burgess-Beynon. In that case, after an
arrest, the defendant became angry and kicked out the rear
window of the police vehicle. The defendant in that case was
charged with damaging a jail. The sole issue on appeal in
Burgess-Beynon, was whether "other place of confinement" under
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-418 included police vehicles.
(R., pp.56-57 (footnote omitted) (case citations omitted).)

Dugan asserts the

Burgess-Beynon decision is limited only "to that court's interpretation of the
intent of its legislature." (Appellant's brief, p.11.)
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Although not controlling law, Burgess-Beynon is useful based on the
almost identical nature of not only the facts in the individual cases, but the
underlying statutes at issue. The Utah damaging jails statute at issue provided
"A person who willfully and intentionally breaks down, pulls down, destroys,
floods, or otherwise damages any public jailor other place of confinement is
guilty of a felony of the third degree."

Burgess-Beynon, 99 P.3d at 384 (citing

Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-418 (2002)). The Utah Court of Appeals was similarly
faced with Burgess-Beynon's argument that a place of confinement as
envisioned by the statute should be limited to a building such as a jail, prison, or
other penal facility.

19.:. at 384-385.

The court in Burgess-Beynon noted nothing

in the plain language of the statute required that a place of confinement be
limited to a building and reasoned a police vehicle could be a "place of
confinement for the detention and transportation of individuals arrested for
criminal activity" where the plain meaning of confinement merely requires "the
state of being physically contained within some type of boundary."

19.:. at 385.

The district court in the case at hand found the plain language of the
statute at issue did not limit a place of confinement to an actual jailor prison cell,
stating, "had the legislature intended 'other place of confinement' to mean
'correctional facility," it would have just used 'correctional facility' in lieu of 'other
place of confinement'" in the statue. (R., pp.57-58.) Because it did not, there is
no limitation on the plain language of the statute which would preclude a
transport vehicle, utilized by the sheriffs department to transport individuals who
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are in the custody of the department from jail to court for sentencing, from being
recognized as another place of confinement for purposes of the statute.
The plain language of the statute is consistent with the obvious purpose of
the statute itself. Damage caused to a jail cell or other place of confinement
potentially causes a greater risk to others.

The Supreme Court has

acknowledged the legislature found damaging a jail to be more serious than
damaging other real or personal property. State v. Ash, 94 Idaho 542, 546 493
P.2d 701, 705 (1971). The basis for such a conclusion is reasonable:
When damage is done to a jail, inmates may escape; prisoners
may have to be removed from the premises, and movement always
creates security problems. Where a window is broken, as in this
case, pieces of glass may be easily concealed on an individual's
person; various dangerous uses can be made of it-e.g., as a
weapon for attacking guards or other prisoners, or as an implement
to effect an escape.

kl

This increased risk is not limited to just those confined spaces within a

building.

In fact, the concern in even more apparent in a transport vehicle.

Dugan was sentenced to a period of incarceration and confined in a county
transport vehicle to be taken back to the jail at which time he was kicking and
head-butting windows and door panels in the vehicle.

(R., pp.53-54.)

Such

actions could have presented a variety of dangers to law enforcement personnel
and others had Dugan been able to effectuate an escape or conceal a weapon
salvaged from the damage he caused to his place of confinement.
Dugan's alternative claim that the rule of lenity applies to his case also
fails. "The rule of lenity requires that ambiguous criminal statutes should be read
narrowly and be construed in favor of the defendant." State v. Jones, 151 Idaho
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943, 947, 265 P.3d 1155, 1159 (citations omitted). "[T]he rule of lenity only
applies if, after considering text, structure, history, and purpose, there remains a
grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute such that the Court must simply
guess as to what [the legislature] intended." Barber v. Thomas, 130 S.Ct. 2499,
2508-09 (2010) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The "rule does not
require a court to disregard the purpose of a statute when it is clear from the
context," Jones, 151 Idaho at 947,265 P.3d at 1159, and the mere "grammatical
possibility of a defendant's interpretation does not command a resort to the rule
of lenity if the interpretation proffered by the defendant reflects an implausible
reading of the [legislative] purpose." Abbott v. U.S., 131 S.Ct. 18, 31 n.9 (2010)
(internal quotations omitted).
Because the injuring jails statute is not ambiguous, the rule of lenity does
not apply to this case. The district correctly concluded the injuring jails statute
applied to Dugan's conduct; Dugan has failed to show error in the denial of his
motion to dismiss.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm district court's denial
of Dugan's motion to dismiss.
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